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This paper presents a theoretical model emphasising energy investments’
characteristics of uncertainty and irreversibility. The theoretical model
suggests threshold effects. Firms are induced to substitute away from energy
only if prices of energy exceed a certain threshold level and they reverse the
technology only if energy prices are low enough. Estimating a simple
investment relation using panel data for the Dutch economy, we find
evidence for threshold effects.
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1.  Introduction
Governments of most developed countries aim to substantially reduce energy use to
limit the emission of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide). The effectiveness of
taxing energy use depends on the substitution elasticity between inputs in production
and on technological progress. Analysis of past experience may give insight in the
potential effectiveness of energy taxation to induce a decrease in energy use.
Examination of the data indicates that the 1973-1994 period can be divided in
two sub-periods. From 1973 to 1986, energy prices went up, while prices have been
observed to fall quite substantially in later years, as can be seen from Figure 1.
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Figure 1  Energy prices (1990=100) for eight sectors of industry of the Dutch
















This subdivision may be important as the economic consequences of energy price
increases and decreases are generally not symmetric. The literature on the potential
causes of asymmetric responses to energy price increases and decreases has focused
on the importance of irreversibility. If adjustment to changes in relative prices
involves adaptation costs, economic agents have an incentive to postpone the
adjustment. The incentive to postpone is even stronger when there is uncertainty
                                                     
1Sectoral energy prices have been calculated on the basis of the share of the various energy
carriers in a sector’s energy use.3
about the persistence of the change. If adjustments are costly and the future is
uncertain, the option value of waiting increases because new information is likely to
arrive over time, which may exceed the foregone benefits of adjusting straightaway.
This idea has been applied at various levels in the economy. The literature focusing at
the sectoral level, initiated by Hamilton (1988), attacks the idea that production
factors are able to relocate smoothly from one sector to another. If production factors
(mainly capital and labour) are specialised, it may be optimal not to immediately
leave adversely affected sectors and to move to positively affected sectors, but to
remain unemployed and wait for conditions to improve. At the micro level, firms are
likely to postpone irreversible investment expenditures on both energy-saving
technologies and their reversal towards energy-intensive technologies (see for
example Bernanke, 1983). This means that firms will not respond immediately to
energy price increases; but if they have responded, energy prices will have to fall
substantially before the investment is reversed.
Empirical studies seem to corroborate this explanation of asymmetric
responses. At the micro-economic level there is evidence pointing to the fact that
firms and consumers adapt faster (and stronger) to energy price increases than to
price decreases (e.g. Bacon, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Gately, 1992;
Kirchgässner and Kübler, 1992; Mork, 1989; Ryan et al., 1996). At the macro-level,
asymmetries may also be important. It has been observed that economic activity is
more strongly affected by increases in the energy price than by decreases (Dargay and
Gately, 1994; Gardner and Joutz, 1996; Mork et al., 1994; Mory, 1993; Smyth,
1993). However, not all price increases will have an equally strong impact on
investments in energy-saving technologies. If energy prices increase after a period of
low prices, the change is merely a recovery that is unlikely to induce additional
investments in energy efficiency. Only “all time highs” will induce new investments
in energy efficiency (Hamilton, 1996). If such an asymmetric response exists, it has
important policy implications. Currently, energy prices are relatively low after a
period of significant price increases (1973-1986). This means that (part of the)4
industry has already geared its technology to higher energy prices in the past.
2
Increasing energy tax rates now (as part of environmental policy) is therefore
expected not to have a strong impact on investment behavior and technology choice,
and thus result in only modest reductions in energy use. More likely, firms are forced
to simply incur the rise in costs. This means that in order to achieve a substantial
reduction in energy use, energy prices should be increased considerably with
potentially high costs in terms of, for example, international competitiveness.
However, in the post-1986 period, energy prices are much lower and also less subject
to fluctuations. Given the positive correlation between the level of energy prices and
their variance (e.g. Ferderer, 1996), uncertainty is likely to be smaller in the post-
1986 period. As this may also affect the responsiveness of Dutch industry to changes
in energy prices (and hence to taxation), the impact of uncertainty should be
analyzed. To explore the consequences of irreversibility and uncertainty for the
environmental effectiveness of energy taxation in the Netherlands, the mechanisms
behind asymmetric responses are elucidated through the use of a simple investment
model presented in the next section.
On the basis of this model we show that, following a period of energy price
increases, prices will have to drop substantially before energy-saving technologies are
to be replaced by energy-intensive ones. This drop is likely to be larger (i) the higher
the adjustment costs, (ii) the faster energy prices are expected to increase over time
and (iii) the higher uncertainty about future prices. In turn, this means that energy
price recoveries will not have much impact on energy use, suggesting that energy
policy in periods of low energy prices will not be very effective.
The next section presents a theoretical model which shows that there are
threshold effects to explain these asymmetries. Section 3 discusses the implications of
the theoretical model. In section 4, an empirical analysis is undertaken for eight
sectors of Dutch industry to estimate these threshold effects. Section 5 concludes.
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2.  Investing under uncertainty
In this section, an illustration is provided why asymmetric reponses to energy price
changes referred to in the previous section may arise. The main features causing the
asymmetric response are the sunk-cost nature of investments in new technologies,
exacerbated by the existence of uncertainty about the future. Suppose that there are
two alternative technologies available for firms. A given quantity of goods can be
produced by either an energy-intensive or a labour-intensive technology. Suppose that
inputs for the energy-intensive technology are E1 units of energy, and L1 units of
labour, while the corresponding inputs for the labour-intensive technology are E2 and
L2, respectively. From the assumption it is clear that E1>E2 and L1<L2. For notational
convenience, define DE=E1-E2 and DL=L2-L1. Furthermore, assume that the
adjustment costs (CA) from switching either from the energy-intensive to labour-
intensive technology or vice versa, are the same.
3
With respect to the prices of both types of inputs, we assume that the price of
labour (W) is constant and known throughout, but that future energy prices (PE) are
uncertain. Since most types of energy currently employed come from depletable
resources, we assume a time trend for prices, but disturbances may force the energy
price to deviate from its trend path. More specifically, the energy price is assumed to
follow a Brownian motion:
(1) dP P dt P dz EE E =+ as .
In this equation, a is the trend parameter and  dt dz e = , where e is a normally
distributed independent variable with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 1. This
implies that E(dPE)=aPE dt with variance s
22 Pd t E  (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 70-
71). Therefore, the expected energy price at time t equals:
                                                     
3Note that this assumption seems unnecessarily restrictive. However, dropping it would have
clear-cut consequences for the qualitative results derived in this section. If adjustment costs
from energy-intensive to energy-saving technologies are higher than the reversal (which
seems plausible because of, for instance, uncertainty with respect to the performance of new
technologies and maybe also because of environmental regulations requiring emission
cleaning activities), the conclusions of this section will only be strengthened.6




Now the costs and benefits of switching from the energy-intensive technology to the
labour-intensive technology can be determined. The change in technology results in
savings on energy expenses, but expenditures on labour increase. Taking into account
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where r is the (exogenously determined) discount rate.
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After implementing the labour-intensive technology, the firm may decide to
reverse its investment if the price of energy is sufficiently low (see below). For a
certain energy price level PE, the value of this reversal option equals:
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What energy price is sufficiently high to induce the firm to switch towards the
energy-saving (i.e. labour-intensive) technology? In each period, the firm compares
the benefits of undertaking the investment (in terms of cost reductions achieved) with
the benefits of postponing the decision one period.  The latter include access to more
information about energy prices. Given the uncertainty that the firm faces, postponing
the decision reduces the probability of investing while such an investment turns out to
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4The results have been derived using dynamic programming, which is based on the
assumption that the price risk cannot be spanned by constructing an appropriate market
portfolio. If we would have dropped this (implicit) assumption, contingent claims analysis
could be used which would have enabled us to derive a risk-adjusted discount rate. Using the
capital asset market pricing approach, this discount rate would be equal to r PM +fr s ,
wheref is the market price of risk and  r PM the correlation coefficient between market risk
and the riskiness of the energy price (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 185).7
The value W
ES
E P ()  is labeled the “termination value”. When the firm decides to
undertake the investment, its expected return is known. The expected return of
waiting (the second term in the brackets) is usually referred to as the “continuation
value”. The firm's optimal decision maximizes the net present value of the investment
option  F
ES. As soon as the termination value exceeds the continuation value, the
investment is undertaken. The energy price for which this is just the case will be




Applying Ito calculus, the following differential equation is obtained:
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This term captures the impact of price uncertainty on the critical energy price level at
which the switch towards the energy-saving technology will be carried out. The
general solution is of the form 
2 1
2 1 ) (
b b
E E E
ES P A P A P F + = where b1 and b2 represent
the positive and negative roots respectively. The higher the energy price, the higher
the value of the energy-saving investment option. This implies that the term with the
negative root can be ignored: A2 equals zero. Then the critical value of the energy
price can be determined by using two additional conditions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994;
Pindyck, 1991). First, in the optimum it must hold that at the critical energy price
level, the value of the investment project is equal to the termination
value: F
ES ES =W : given the fact the investment is undertaken, waiting apparently no
longer has a positive net value (see equation 5). In the second place, optimality
requires that the option value function  F
ES  and the termination value function W
ES
meet tangently at the critical price level: FP
ES
P
ES =W . Using these two additional


















































The critical value under uncertainty, irreversibility and flexibility with respect to the






 as b 1 1 > .
After the switch towards the energy-saving technology, the energy price may
fall such that the firm may decide to reverse its decision and to re-install an energy-
intensive (but labour-saving) technology. In each period, it weighs the benefits of
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Hence,
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This time only the negative root (b2) plays a role: the lower the energy price, the
higher the likelihood that the reversal will be profitable and hence the higher the
value of the reversal option. Using F
EI EI =W andFP
EI
P













































 and hence the calculated critical value is
lower than the value indicated by the NPV approach.9
3.  The implications of investing under uncertainty
The analysis presented above implies that there is an asymmetry in the response to
energy price increases and decreases. The existence of adjustment costs, high
expected rates of energy price increases and uncertainty about future prices drive a
wedge between the critical energy price for a switch towards labour-intensive
technologies, and the critical price for its reversal. Hence, in response to a price
increase, investments will be undertaken. But a subsequent (moderate) drop in energy
prices will not induce the reversal towards the energy-intensive technology.
Figure 2 Inertia price gaps as a function of the expected rate of energy price
increases, for two different levels of uncertainty (s = 0.01 and s = 0.05).
Parameter values:  . 1 . 0 , 1 , 125 . 0 , 1 , 1 = = = = D = D A C W r L E
This point is illustrated in Figure 2, where critical energy price lines are drawn for
various time trends and for two levels of uncertainty (s = 0.01 and s = 0.05). From
Figure 2 it is clear that there is a gap (an area between the two critical energy price
levels) where prices can fluctuate without firms adapting their production
technologies. Expectations about future price developments play an important role in
deciding whether or not to invest in energy-saving technology. Indeed, the critical
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sooner (although the reduction is not substantial), but more importantly that the
energy price should be much lower before the firm will start contemplating to reverse
its decision. The reason is that high trend values compensate for stochastic drops in
the energy price. The reversal will thus only take place if the actual energy price is
quite low: only then can it be expected to stay at a low level for a substantial period of
time (see equation 1). Furthermore, the higher the uncertainty with respect to future
prices, the longer a firm will postpone investing: the higher the uncertainty, the larger
the inertia gap.
It is clear that the asymmetry in the response to energy price changes will
increase with a and s. If the upper critical level (i.e., switch towards labour-intensive
technology) has just been attained, the firm will undertake the investment. However,
to reverse that decision, the energy price should drop substantially. For a large range
of price decreases, nothing will happen in terms of energy use. The size of the inertia
gap is larger (i) the higher the expected rate of price increase and (ii) the more
uncertainty about future price levels. Of course, adaptation costs (CA ) also play a
role: the higher these costs, the larger the inertia gap.
4.  Threshold estimation
We have gathered data on a panel of eight sectors of industry for the Dutch economy.
These sectors are agriculture, food and beverages, textiles and clothing, paper
industry, basic metal industry, building materials, chemical industry and construction.
These sectors are chosen on the basis of data availability for a longer time period.
Data on energy use and energy prices are not (yet) available for the period before
1973 and after 1994 (at least not measured in a consistent way with the 1973-1994
period). Furthermore, not all variables are available for the chemical industry for the
period 1973-1976, so we restricted the time period to the period 1977-1994.
5
                                                     
5There are three main sources of the data: volumes and prices of value added and labour are
taken from the P-series of the National Accounts 1997 of CBS Statistics Netherlands (CBS,
1998). Data on the stock of capital in 1990-prices are provided by the CPB, Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Data on the use of energy and the price of energy are
based on the publication De Nederlandse Energiehuishouding (CBS, various issues). Some11
The implication of the analysis above is that regression functions are not
identical across all observations in the sample: the response to energy price changes is
typically asymmetrical. To avoid a arbitrary selection of thresholds we estimate the
threshold using threshold regression methods with individual-specific fixed effects
(Hansen, 1999). If we have a balanced panel of observations (i=1,…,n individuals
and t=1,…,T time periods), we can write the equation of interest as for two thresholds
as:
6
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where xit is a k-vector, and qit is the threshold variable and  1 and  2 are the thresholds,
I is an indicator function that has a value one if the argument is true and zero
otherwise. The error term is iid with mean zero and finite variance.
7 The threshold is
estimated using least squares. The observations are first sorted on the threshold
variable and the search for the thresholds is restricted to specific quantiles (the more
quantiles the finer the grid to which the search is limited). This reduces the number of
regressions and still generates sufficiently precise estimates (see Hansen, 1999, p.
349-350). Bootstrapping simulates the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio
test. This test is used to test whether the threshold effect is statistically significant
under the null of no threshold:  1  2  3. If the null is rejected, similar tests are used
to test whether there are one, two or even more thresholds
In line with our theoretical specification, we take as threshold variable the
price of energy relative to the nominal wage rate. Next, we define the explanatory
variable yit as the rate of growth of the stock of capital, i.e. net investment divided by
the stock of capital, and xit as a 3-dimensional vector of regressors, again in rates of
growth, consisting of the ratio of the user cost of capital  over the wage rate over
(R/W), the ratio of the price of energy over the wage rate (PE/W), and the growth rate
of gross value added (X). This equation captures the substitution effect as well as an
accelerator effect. The individual-specific fixed effect which is included picks up the
                                                                                                                                          
data series had to be constructed; the methodology applied is described in Appendix A. More
information is available in Kuper and Van Soest (1999).
6 It is possible to calculate triple thresholds instead of two as in equation (14).12
rate of depreciation, so that the explanatory variable is the ratio of gross investment
over the stock of capital. This specification is a simple accelerator investment
equation including percentage changes of relative prices. We interpret this equation in
the following way. Changes in relative prices lead firms to invest in machines with
different technologies. This change of technology is represented by changes in input
intensities which in turn reflects the change in relative prices. The increase in the
growth rate of value added leads firms to invest more in machines with unchanged
input intensities, i.e. firms invest more in existing technologies.
We have a balanced panel consisting of 8 sectors of industry and 16 years of
observation (1979-1994). We specify 100 quantiles to limit the search and use 300
bootstrap replications to construct asymptotically valid p-values. We define the ratio
of energy prices to the wage rate as threshold variable. In principle the coefficients
for all elements of vector xit may be regime-dependent, i.e. dependent on the
threshold variable. Experiments suggest that there are level-thresholds if we lag the
threshold variable one period. We find strong evidence for thresholds only if the
accelerator effect is considered to be regime dependent. The null of no thresholds is
rejected at 5%. Next, we find strong evidence for two thresholds: the test statistic F
equals 14.1 (the 10%, 5% and 1% critical values are 6.7, 9.6 and 13.0 respectively)
and the bootstrap p-value equals 0.007. This means we can reject the null of one
threshold at a 1%-significant level. Furthermore, the triple threshold model is rejected
(p-value equals 0.12), so we conclude that there are two thresholds. The point
estimate of the thresholds 1 and  2 are 1.41 and 2.60 (where it hits the zero axis in
Figures 3 and 4 respectively) and the 95% confidence intervals are [1.32, 2.29] and
[2.49, 2.76], these are the values of thresholds 1 and  2 for which the likelihood ratio
lies beneath the dotted lines in Figures 3 and 4.
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results. As mentioned above we did not
find evidence (sofar) for regime-dependent effects of changes in relative prices. This
implies that the coefficients of the relative price changes are the same across the
sample. However, the accelerator differs across regimes. We have identified two
                                                                                                                                          
7 This iid assumption rules out lagged dependent variables.13
thresholds which implies that there are three regimes: PE/WPE/W
PE/W>2.60.
Figure 3 Confidence interval construction in a double threshold model.
Figure 4 Confidence interval construction in a double threshold model.14
Table 1 Regression estimates: double threshold model
Regressor Coefficient OLS SE White SE
ORJ5: 0.023 0.017 0.018
ORJ3E/W) 0.026 0.019 0.012
I(PE/W 0.017 0.085 0.044
I(1.41<PE/W 0.489 0.092 0.102
ORJ;
I(PE/W>2.60) 0.028 0.122 0.082
Relative prices, which are regime-independent, are not very significant. If the price of
energy relative to the wage rate is above 1.41 and below 2.60, the accelerator is
highly significant. Hence, relative prices seem to matter but in the middle regime
(between the thresholds) gross value added is more important. This may be
interpreted as relative more investment in existing technologies and less investment in
new energy-efficient technologies in the second regime.
It is interesting to know which years and which sectors fall in each of the
regimes. Tables 2 and 3 lists the number of observations in each regime per year and
per sector. From these tables we draw the following conclusions:
-  The first regime coincides with post-1986 observations, while the third regime is
the pre-1986 period.
-  The middle regime is dominated by observations from the post-1986 period;
-  The first regime consists mainly of observations (16 out of 22) from the high
energy intensive chemical industry and the basic metal industry.15
Table 2 Number of observations in each regime per year
Regime
Year I(PE/W I(1.41<PE/W I(PE/W>2.60) Total
1979 7 1 8
1980 3 5 8
1981 2 6 8
1982 2 6 8
1983 2 6 8
1984 2 6 8
1985 2 6 8
1986 7 1 8
1987 2 6 8
1988 2 6 8
1989 2 6 8
1990 2 6 8
1991 2 6 8
1992 4 4 8
1993 3 5 8
1994 5 3 8
Total 22 69 37 128
Table 3 Number of observations in each regime per sector
Regime
I(PE/W I(1.41<PE/W I(PE/W>2.60) Total




















Total 22 69 37 12816
How do we interpret these results? Relative prices seem to matter most in the
chemical industry and the basic metal industry if prices of energy drop relative to
wages, i.e. the accelerator effect in these sectors is small and insignificant. This may
induce a (faster) return to more energy-using technologies. Other sectors are more
reluctant to return to earlier energy-using technologies. These sectors are perhaps hurt
more by the earlier rise in energy-prices, and are locked in energy-saving
technologies in the sense that these sectors may not find it profitable to return to
technologies that reflect the current low energy-prices. Taxing energy in the sectors
locked in older technologies will not be very effective.
5.  Conclusions
This paper aims to shed light on the effectiveness of environmental policy in periods
of high and low energy prices. It is argued that while firms are likely to invest in
energy-saving technologies when energy prices hit all-time highs, they are unlikely to
reverse the investment in periods of lower energy prices. Using Hansen’s 1999
threshold estimation technique we do find threshold effect. Only if the price of energy
relative to the wage rate is between two thresholds values, firms use existing
technologies rather then invest in even less energy-intensive technologies. This
implies that in periods of relatively low, and relative high energy prices, small
increases in energy taxation perhaps may induce some changes in the production
structure. High energy-intensive sectors like the chemical industry and the basic metal
industry are more responsive to energy price changes and hence to higher energy
taxes.17
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Appendix A Data construction
Concerning the data used in this paper, three series had to be constructed: the prices
and quantities of intermediate output from the first level Z and the user cost of capital.
The intermediate (composite) output in constant prices can be calculated as the
nominal composite output divided by its price index. The value of the composite
output in nominal terms equals nominal capital expenditures plus nominal energy
expenditures:
(A.1) E P RK Z P E Z + º .
If we re-scale the prices such that in the base-year PE=R =1, K and E can be
calculated in base-year prices. Then composite output Z is simply Z=K+E.
This means that we can calculate the price index of this combined output Z as a


















Dividing expressions (A.1) and (A.2) yields the volume of input Z.
The (nominal) user cost of capital is not calculated in the usual way.
8 Here,
we made use of data on the stock of capital (measured in 1990-prices) kindly
provided by CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. We constructed
capital income resulting from production as the gross operating surplus corrected for
wage income of self-employed, were self-employed earn the same wage rate as
employees. The nominal rental price of capital is now simply calculated as capital
income (in current prices) divided by the stock of capital in 1990-prices.
Finally, given data on the volume of labour input (L), capital input (K) and
energy input (E), and their respective prices (W, R and PE), we can construct gross
output in nominal terms as value added in nominal terms plus the value of the energy
input:  PQ WL RK P E E =++ , where WL+RK equals nominal value added.
                                                     
8The most simple Jorgenson type of user cost of capital is  ) log ( d + D - = I I P i P R , where PI is
the purchase price of a unit of capital, i is the (nominal) interest rate, and d is the (constant)
rate of depreciation.